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“The pressing need in Latin America is to promote the middle-class 
revolution as speedily as possible… If the possessing classes of Latin 
America make the middle-class revolution impossible, they will make a 
‘workers-and-peasants’ revolution inevitable… they will guarantee a 
Castro or a Perón.” 
– Arthur M. Schlesinger, Special Assistant to President Kennedy1 
 
In the formative days of a nascent Kennedy presidency, Arthur M. 
Schlesinger revealed – perhaps unwittingly – the core issue that would 
define United States policy toward Chile for the next two decades. The 
ostensible goals of that policy were not markedly different from those 
pursued elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere or, indeed, the rest of the 
world: expelling Communism from neutral or U.S.-influenced regions, 
promoting favorable economic environments for U.S. financial interests, 
and showcasing American military and ideological superiority. 
Exacerbating and preying upon existing socioeconomic class tensions in 
Chilean society to further these goals were not, however, commonly 
deployed tactics. They display a level of sophistication and societal 
integration not always seen in Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations. 
U.S. covert action in Chile is an example of a long-term, forward-thinking 
strategy that does not often arise in the CIA’s playbook; a strategy in which 
the CIA was content to bide their time for over a decade while slowly and 
meticulously developing a social and institutional foothold in the country. 
Perhaps their most critical tools for constructing this type of infrastructure 
were labor unions or, more specifically, American organized labor working 
parallel to and sometimes in concert with Chilean trade unions. By spending 
                                                 
1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Report to the President on Latin American Mission: February 12-
March 3, 1961 (Washington: March 10, 1961), 12. 
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years subverting these labor unions and laying the groundwork for a future 
war of ideology, the CIA pried open existing inter-class fissures and used 
them as inroads to enforce U.S. foreign policy objectives in the period 
preceding the overthrow of Salvador Allende.  
The academic literature concerning the nature of foreign policy in 
the labor movement has evolved considerably over the last half century. The 
most generally acceptable theory is that interest in foreign affairs is inherent 
within the labor movement, but American organized labor worked in tandem 
with the U.S. government to achieve mutually desirable aims.2 That is, the 
American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) – the domestic institution through which the CIA funneled their labor 
influence in Chile – developed foreign policy objectives independent from 
the government for the benefit of their members and the furtherance of their 
general mission. The government did not define AFL-CIO foreign policy 
but, since the two policies often coincided, the CIA worked through the 
organization to conduct its work covertly – work that benefitted both 
institutions. An excellent example of this is articulated by the American 
Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD); “both the AFL-CIO and the 
State Department favor strengthening democratic labor unions in Latin 
America… which can redistribute income and bring about structural reforms 
in the ownership of the means of production.”3 This was meant to be a retort 
against an accusation that the AIFLD is little more than a tool operated by 
the State Department to promote its short-term goals. Instead of 
convincingly disproving the accusation, the AIFLD inadvertently provided 
an example that can be interpreted to support the accusation’s truth. None 
other than “Assistant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer said that the 
American Institute for Free Labor Development is a reflection of the United 
States policy of cooperation ‘with the free and democratic trade unions of 
                                                 
2 Kim Scipes, AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or 
Sabotage? (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), xxi. 
3 American Institute for Free Labor Development, Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred 
Hirsch (April 22, 1974), 2. 
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the hemisphere.’”4 Direct CIA funding of AFL-CIO efforts began long 
before the effort in Chile. The AFL (before merging with the CIO) 
established the Free Trade Union Committee to oppose Communist efforts, 
primarily in Europe. The scope of the AFL’s involvement on the continent 
after World War II involved, among other things, participating in electoral 
manipulation in France and Italy, an endeavor funded and directed by the 
CIA.5 In Latin America, AFL/CIA operations initially included the 
Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT), an anti-
Communist regional trade union that played a role in the CIA effort to 
overthrow Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 before being 
declared effectively defunct after the successful Cuban revolution.6 ORIT’s 
influence in the region continued to wane due to being perceived by Latin 
Americans as a subsidiary of the U.S. State Department after its role in the 
coups of both Arbenz in Guatemala and João Goulart in Brazil. The need for 
a reliable, competent operational arm in Latin America led the AFL-CIO to 
form the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).7 
The AIFLD was formed in late 1961, ostensibly to be a training 
institute for Latin American union officials. At the organization’s ten-year 
anniversary in 1972, six prominent Latin American and Caribbean labor 
leaders anticlimactically declared the AIFLD’s mission to be “bread, peace, 
and liberty for all in the Americas and the Caribbean.”8 What the AIFLD 
lacked in convincing public relations it made up for in bureaucratic 
infrastructure; it removed the need for the AFL-CIO or CIA to divide their 
temporal and monetary resources between myriad international 
                                                 
4 American Institute for Free Labor Development, The AIFLD Report 7, no. 12 (December 
1969), 1. 
5 Scipes, AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers, 31. 
6 Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales, Una Amistad Esquiva: Las Relaciones de Estados 
Unidos y Chile (Santiago: Pehuén Editores, 1987), 56. Serafino Romualdi, Presidents and Peons: 
Recollection of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967), 241-
245. Scipes, AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers, 32.  
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Survey of the Alliance for Progress: 
Labor Policies and Programs, July 15, 1968, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, S. Rep. 87-782, 9. 
8 American Institute for Free Labor Development, The AIFLD Report 10, no. 6 (June 1972), 
1. 
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organizations or trade unions in foreign countries.9 In this way, the AIFLD 
served as a clearinghouse of sorts; a one-stop shop for grassroots infiltration 
and propaganda in Latin America. As some scholars have argued, it has also 
served as a covert-operational arm of the AFL-CIO.10 By 1972, the AIFLD 
had trained over 190,000 Latin American labor leaders including 9,000 in 
Chile and 79 Chileans at U.S. facilities.11 This vast network of potential 
propagandists in a region increasingly susceptible to Communist influence 
quickly caught the attention of the U.S. government; early in the 1960s, the 
AIFLD was already “becoming the organizational basis for American 
labor’s participation in the Alliance [for Progress].”12 The concrete link 
between the CIA, AFL-CIO, and AIFLD was the cast of characters that 
served in AFL-CIO and AIFLD leadership positions, most of whom boasted 
prior or concurrent employment by various branches of the U.S. foreign 
policy apparatus, including the CIA. 
Julius Mader, author of an extensive dossier allegedly exposing 
over 3,000 CIA agents, claims that the CIA, State Department, Peace Corps, 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and other foreign affairs 
branches integrated their personnel regularly. He estimates that 
approximately 2,200 active agents were working abroad under official 
diplomatic pretenses.13 Forty-four of these agents had worked in Chile by 
1968, still five years before the coup to unseat Allende. Mader identified 
George Meany14 and Emmanuel Boggs15 as key CIA operatives working 
                                                 
9 Fred Hirsch “The Labour Movement: Penetration Point for U.S. Intelligence and 
Transnationals” in Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, eds., The CIA and the Labour Movement 
(Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1977), 7. 
10 Dan Kurzman, “Lovestone’s Cold War: The AFL-CIO Has Its Own CIA,” The New 
Republic (June 25, 1966), 21. 
11 American Institute for Free Labor Development, Annual Progress Report: 1962-1972 – A 
Decade of Worker-to-Worker Cooperation (Washington: AIFLD, 1972), 1. Hirsch, “The Labor 
Movement,” 11. 
12 American Institute for Free Labor Development, AIFLD: Twenty-Five Years of Solidarity 
with Latin American Workers (Washington: AIFLD, 1987), 2. 
13 Julius Mader, Who’s Who in CIA: A Biographical Reference Work on 3,000 Officers of the 
Civil and Military Branches of the Secret Services of the USA in 120 Countries (Berlin: Julius Mader, 
1968), 10-11. 
14 Ibid., 354. 
15 Ibid., 63. 
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28 
within the labor movement; Meany as AFL-CIO president and Boggs as a 
rather transient, shadowy figure who held multiple leadership positions in 
local and national labor unions before becoming AIFLD’s director in Chile. 
One of Boggs’ protégés, Leon Vilarin, is credited with leading the 1972 
Chilean truckers’ strike that began as a group of mine supervisors striking 
to protest the nationalization of the Kennecott and Anaconda copper mines 
– both American-owned and AIFLD members.16 The mine strike itself owed 
its existence to Julio Bazán, a mine administrator and fascist who called for 
“an authoritarian government” to execute a “massive massacre of 
Communists and leftists.”17 Bazán worked in concert with the National 
Command for Gremio Defense, a confederation of myriad professional 
unions funded by the AIFLD with CIA funds.18  
The first person to suggest the formation of the AIFLD, Joseph A. 
Beirne, served as President of the Communications Workers of America – 
an AFL-CIO affiliate – and was a member of Postal, Telephone, and 
Telegraph International (PTTI), a union identified as having received CIA 
funds.19 Beirne was also Secretary-Treasurer of the AIFLD. The 
communications unions became crucially important in 1962, when AIFLD 
executive director William C. Doherty, Jr., a regional representative of 
PTTI, attempted to seize control of them after their leadership called for the 
nationalization of the American-owned International Telephone and 
Telegraph Corporation, also a CIA collaborator.20 Doherty, for his own part, 
was the figurehead of corporate interests in the AIFLD. He famously 
claimed that the AIFLD executive board – bursting at the seams with 
business leaders – showed the benefits of worker-executive cooperation and 
encouraged the decline in hostility toward U.S. corporate interests 
                                                 
16 Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 27. 
17 North American Congress on Latin America, “Collision Course: Chile Before the Coup,” 
NACLA’s Latin America and Empire Report 7, no. 8 (October, 1973), 16-25. 
18 Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 26. 
19 Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Random 
House, 1969), 419. 
20 Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 19. Committee on Foreign Relations, Survey of the 
Alliance for Progress, 10. 
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throughout Latin America.21 This is widely regarded as a Freudian slip of 
sorts, revealing as a possible ulterior motive for the AIFLD’s existence the 
goal of dispelling “hostility of Latin American workers toward U.S. 
corporations.”22 These links to business leaders and government agents are 
key to understanding the monetary flows within and through the AIFLD.  
As with most government-business joint enterprises, one need only 
follow the money to find the influence. The paradigm of AIFLD operations 
is that of a tripartite alliance: government, labor, and business.23 The funding 
records between the State Department and the AIFLD are particularly 
curious. The State Department openly provides the majority of AIFLD funds 
“when labor’s goals and U.S. foreign policy goals coincide.”24 However, 
much of this funding comes in the form of large, vaguely written proposals 
that allow the AIFLD to use the money for initiatives that could not be signed 
off on or plausibly denied by the State Department.25 Some scholars have 
surmised that the combination of large sums of money for which the AIFLD 
is held only minimally accountable and weak State Department control of 
the AIFLD has resulted in a foreign policy essentially being crafted by the 
AFL-CIO.26 Funds for the AIFLD have increased each year even in the 
presence of documented “deficiencies in financial matters, such as 
misappropriation of funds… cash shortages… overdrafts… and lack of 
accounting records.”27 These fly-by-night accounting practices are 
characteristic of CIA activity; accounts payable are kept in only very general 
terms when the object of the expenditures is extralegal or publicly damning. 
A common government conduit of CIA funds and project contracts is the 
USAID, a government agency which also came to use the AIFLD as an 
                                                 
21 William C. Doherty, Jr., “AIFLD and Latin Labor Building a Modern Society,” AFL-CIO 
Free Trade Union News (July 1966), 3. 
22 Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy, 418. 
23 Ibid., 416. Committee on Foreign Relations, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 16. 
24 AIFLD, Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch, 2. 
25 Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 16. 
26 Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy, 433. 
27 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the 
United States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968, January 3, 1969, 91st Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 
14, 189-191. Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy, 16. 
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operational arm for many of its social welfare projects. In fact, of the $15.4 
million in total labor expenditures by the USAID, two-thirds finds its way 
into the pockets of the AIFLD.28 By 1967, 89% of AIFLD funds had come 
from USAID contracts.29 Using these USAID-facilitated procurement 
methods, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus has harnessed the AIFLD as its 
primary mechanism “for supplying technical assistance – education and 
training and social projects – to Latin American trade unions.”30 The 
CIA/USAID link extends to Chile as well; the USAID designated to the CIA 
responsibility for representing their interests in business transactions and 
complementing their programs in the countryside via the Confederación 
Nacional Campesina, a national trade union of rural workers and farmers.31  
The CNC was not the only trade union subverted by the 
AIFLD/CIA cooperative. The AIFLD attempted to form a confederation of 
labor unions to parallel the Central Única de Trabajadores (CUT), the 
Marxist-oriented confederation of blue-collar labor unions. The product was 
the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT). The CNT failed early 
on and was not revived until the junta took power in 1973, but it amassed a 
small but significant following that would prove critical to future AIFLD 
operations in Chile, including COMACH, a union of maritime workers.32 
The interlocking directorates characteristic of AIFLD operations are seen in 
the CNT as well; its president, Bernardo Ibañez, moved to Washington to 
become the AIFLD’s Professor of International Labor33 and two of its 
founders, Hector Durán and Ernesto Miranda, came to be employed by the 
AIFLD in Chile.34  
                                                 
28 Committee on Foreign Relations, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 6. 
29 Ibid., 11. 
30 Committee on Foreign Relations, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 9. 
31 Eduardo Labarca Goddard, Chile Invadido: Reportaje a la Intromision Extranjera 
(Santiago: Editora Austral, 1968), 182. 
32 Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 19. 
33 American Institute for Free Labor Development, The AIFLD Report 1, no. 5 (November 
1963), 2.  
34 Labarca Goddard, Chile Invadido, 179. 
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Completing the tripartite alliance were private business interests. 
George Meany submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations a 
list of 78 private corporations and businesses that contributed money to the 
AIFLD from 1962-1968.35 Several of these, including United Fruit 
Company and ITT, are known CIA collaborators. In addition, as previously 
referenced, the AIFLD brought in undisclosed sums of money from private 
foundations to found and maintain the organizations. Many of these 
organizations are cross-referenced by The New York Times in a partial list of 
institutions cooperating with the CIA and the subsidiaries funded by those 
institutions.36 This is the template of AIFLD/CIA operations in Latin 
America in the 1960s. Working through this infrastructure, the CIA could 
tap into existing tensions between Chilean socioeconomic classes and 
manipulate them for their own gain. 
By the time Allende won a presidential election in 1970, these class 
tensions had been festering for over fifty years. Throughout the twentieth 
century, the Chilean economy was generally defined by typical, three-class 
structure. The small upper class was wealthy but unable to achieve 
exorbitant wealth because American corporations dominated the economy; 
the middle class was sizable but not overwhelmingly large and was unable 
to develop in terms of wealth; and the vast lower class was exceptionally 
poor by comparison and bore the brunt of all economic shocks.37 When 
Allende was elected in 1970, the bottom 50% of the population accounted 
for only 12% of Chile’s total consumption.38 Chilean political history from 
1920-1964 was a crucible of power struggle between these classes, with each 
subsequent election showcasing the gradual decay of the upper class 
oligarchy in favor of the middle and, eventually, lower classes. The exact 
                                                 
35 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, American Institute for Free Labor 
Development: Hearing with George Meany, President, AFL-CIO, August 1, 1969, 91st Cong., 1st 
sess., H. Doc. 33-948, 21. 
36 “Units Linked With CIA,” The New York Times (February 19, 1967), 27. 
37 ITT-CIA Subversion in Chile: A Case Study in US Corporate Intrigue in the Third World 
(Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1972), 5-8. 
38 Ibid., 5. 
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development of this power struggle is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
the argument demands a brief chronological overview. Throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century, the latifundium system of rural wealth 
stratification caused the unprotected campesino (peasant) class to be 
controlled by wealthier landowners.39 Dissatisfaction with this system, 
among other things, motivated the 1920 election of Arturo Alessandri, who 
challenged the landowning elites by showcasing the rise to power of the 
middle class.40 Following economic collapse, Alessandri was followed by 
two decades of political upheaval before stability returned to Chile and his 
son, Jorge Alessandri, was elected president in 1958. Alessandri the younger 
was not the middle-class champion as was his father; his coalition was that 
of landowners and businessmen, some small entrepreneurs and merchants, 
and middle class members who feared social change lest Allende be 
elected.41 Alessandri’s popularity precipitously declined during his tenure 
and he was replaced in 1964 with Eduardo Frei amid calls for structural 
reform. Frei was elected by a largely middle-class vote; the lower class sided 
with Allende, who saw a marked increase in support compared to 1958.42 
Frei enacted reforms but did not engage in economic revolution, piquing the 
interests of the lower class but leaving them disappointed.43 This 
disappointment finally drove the electorate to Allende, who won the 
presidency in 1970 over a deeply unpopular Christian Democrat candidate 
and the scandal-plagued Alessandri, capping the rise to power of the Chilean 
lower classes and fulfilling Arthur Schlesinger’s prophesy to President 
Kennedy made nine years prior.  
This is the environment in which the AIFLD and CIA set their 
operations in the pre-coup years. The most important of these operations was 
                                                 
39 Armando Uribe, The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1975), 18. 
40 Lois Hecht Oppenheim, Politics in Chile: Socialism, Authoritarianism, and Market 
Democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 11. 
41 Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 22. 
42 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Covert Action 
in Chile, 1963-1973, 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 5. 
43 Oppenheim, Politics in Chile, 26. 
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education. Traditional AIFLD education programs (two to three months in 
length) originally took place only at their facility in Front Royal, Virginia, 
but shorter programs were eventually established at AIFLD outposts in 
many Latin American countries, including Chile in the late 1960s. Meany 
claimed the Front Royal courses were “designed to train trade union teachers 
and technicians who can take their skills back to their respective countries 
to train other trade unionists.”44 The hope was that those receiving the 
training would return to their unions and instill in their comrades the 
information with which they had been imbued in Front Royal (or in their 
respective countries’ “in-house” program), thereby creating a propagandist 
pyramid scheme of sorts. The raw numbers exhibit what appears to be a 
massive influence; by 1977, through these domestic and international 
programs, the AIFLD had trained 243,668 unionists in Latin American and 
the Caribbean alone, 1,600 of them in U.S. facilities. As previously 
referenced, approximately 9,000 Chileans were trained in these types of 
programs.45 Scholars have yet been unable to reliably estimate how many 
Chileans were affected through secondary or tertiary interactions with these 
program veterans. These American-educated unionists provided the AIFLD 
and CIA with vast numbers of ideological subordinates already embedded 
within the very institutions necessary for exploiting Chilean class tensions. 
They had no need to forcefully insert their operatives into Chilean society; 
they had created a veritable army of ideological sleeper cells. They had only 
to organize their sympathizers into an infrastructure which they could 
activate and work within when necessary.  
This infrastructure was the Chilean Confederation of Professionals 
(CUPROCH), formed in May 1971.46 CUPROCH, in and of itself, was not 
a union; it shared members with other unions and was more of a 
                                                 
44 Committee on Foreign Relations, American Institute for Free Labor Development, 7. 
45 Fred Hirsch, An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or, Under the Covers with 
the CIA (San Jose, CA: Fred Hirsch, 1974), 33. Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 11.  
46 Thomas F. O’Brien, Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the 
Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 
2007), 255. 
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confederation of like-minded workers from across diverse industries.47 It 
was, in essence, the AFL-CIO’s second attempt at a confederation of 
workers after the CNT failed many years prior. It was also the administrative 
core of the National Command for Gremio Defense, the group responsible 
for organizing the truckers’ strike that brought the Chilean economy to a 
screeching halt in August 1972. That strike was a significant step for the 
CIA in constructing an environment conducive to promoting a change of 
Chilean leadership.48 In a classic example of interlocking personnel, the 
Secretary of the National Command for Gremio Defense, Jorge Guerrero, 
was one of the 79 Chileans trained at Front Royal.49 He, along with Julio 
Etcheverry and José Estrada of ORIT, personify the AIFLD’s efforts to place 
former students in union leadership positions in which they can be of direct 
service to the AIFLD and CIA; Etcheverry was the first director of the 
AIFLD Chilean program and Estrada served as a paid operative for the 
AIFLD.50 Upon the installation of the junta, no union meetings were allowed 
in Chile save for those among the 26 groups connected to the AIFLD and 
CUPROCH.51 It is possible General Pinochet’s government allowed 
CUPROCH to continue operations simply because its members largely 
joined the fight against Allende, but the connection between the CIA-
supported junta and AIFLD/CUPROCH operations is convincing.  
Applying this operational knowledge to the issue of class tension, 
a divide begins to emerge between blue- and white-collar unions and the 
political influences under which they existed. As Schlesinger predicted, the 
“workers-and-peasants revolution” was inevitable and culminated in the 
election of Allende. Attempting to subvert these lower-class workers would 
have been fruitless for the AFL-CIO and CIA; their support for Allende had 
                                                 
47 Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 26. 
48 Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability 
(New York: The New Press, 2003), 110. 
49 American Institute for Free Labor Development, The AIFLD Report 11, no. 8 (October 
1973), 6. 
50 American Institute for Free Labor Development, The AIFLD Report 1, no. 4 (October 1963), 
5. AIFLD, The AIFLD Report 11, no. 8, 6. Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 15. 
51 Ibid., 31. 
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become nearly unwavering by 1970 and the confederation of unions with 
which most of them allied themselves, the CUT, was Marxist-leaning and 
firmly pro-Allende.52 The logical strategy, therefore, was to focus their 
energies on non-CUT unions and professional workers which, in this case, 
generally meant the white-collar, middle- to upper-class workers who had 
consistently opposed Allende in his bids for the presidency. Of course, not 
all CUPROCH members fit this definition, but certainly enough to justify 
the generalization did comply. The AFL-CIO tacitly admitted in 1974 that 
CUPROCH was composed of wealthier, white-collar workers; “CUPROCH 
is composed mainly of technicians and professional personnel, who have as 
much right to organize as do blue-collar workers.”53 The implication, then, 
is that CUPROCH was not composed of blue-collar workers, otherwise the 
distinction would be not only unnecessary but also misleading.  
A prime example of this dichotomy is the LAN Chile airline strike 
of October 1972, which occurred roughly concurrently with the truckers’ 
strike.54 About 90% of LAN Chile employees were represented by 
SEOLAN, a CUT-affiliated union, while only 10% were affiliated with 
CUPROCH. This 10%, however, were the pilots and “professional” workers 
who occupied the more highly-paid, white-collar positions. Not only was the 
LAN Chile strike not supported by the vast majority of employees, but it had 
to be forced upon them by subversive means. The AIFLD and CUPROCH 
used three of their LAN Chile employees to organize a pilots’ strike in which 
they flew LAN Chile planes into the Santiago Air Force base, thereby 
preventing their commercial use.55 This was a case of a comparatively small 
number of professional workers using their power and resources (and 
CUPROCH/AIFLD affiliation) to exact an effect, disregarding the protests 
of the blue-collar masses. This is where the rubber meets the road; quite 
                                                 
52 The AIFLD Report, 20. 
53 AIFLD, Analysis of Pamphlet on AIFLD by Fred Hirsch, 8. 
54 Salvatore Bizzarro, Historical Dictionary of Chile, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2005), li. 
55 Hirsch, “The Labour Movement,” 29. 
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literally, in the case of the LAN Chile strike. After more than a decade of 
patience and coalition-building, the AIFLD and CIA were finally able to 
utilize the ideological army they had been amassing since 1961, turning the 
battle for control of Chilean organized labor into a proxy war over the future 
of the Allende administration.  
Allende leveraged the Marxist-leaning CUT throughout the latter 
portion of his presidency to pursue his political objectives; namely, staying 
in office. Examples abound from both before and after the coup that exhibit 
the close ties between Allende and CUT-affiliated, generally blue-collar 
industries. Fearing the impending military uprising, Allende called on 
workers to “take to [the] streets” to defend his government on June 29, 
1973.56 Like a well-oiled machine, CUT mobilized its workforce, issuing a 
“call for ‘total mobilization of workers’ to defend” the government and 
“appeal[ing] for international solidarity from other workers 
organizations.”57 CUT even worked directly with the media arm of 
Allende’s political party, Unidad Populár (UP), to broadcast and advertise 
pro-government and pro-labor messages over UP-controlled Radio 
Candalaria. One of these was a call to attend a rally in support of Allende on 
August 28. The only announced speaker was CUT Secretary General 
Rolando Calderón and the slogan of the rally was to be “no to a coup and in 
defense of the constitutional government.”58 On September 12, the day after 
the coup, CUT took to Radio Candalaria once more to implore workers and 
campesinos to “occupy factories and farms” while awaiting further orders 
from CUT, which had seemingly turned into a paramilitary command center 
                                                 
56 United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, No to Dialogue?, July 12, 1973, 2, 
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679138900/FCDA45BA456B43CFPQ/1?accountid=
465. 
57 United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, Still Waiting, September 10, 1973, 
24, 
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679139556/DCF475D95A0F4A8FPQ/1?accountid=
465. 
58 United States Embassy, Santiago to Secretary of State, Merchants Strike Again, August 
28, 1973, 2, 
http://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cl/docview/1679140021/1F3F8D277E6141F2PQ/1?accountid=46
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by this point. In a moment of unintended and limited comic relief, the same 
radio broadcast kindly asked the soldiers to refrain from shouting at the 
workers.59 After the coup had concluded and Allende found dead, examples 
continued to arise that evidenced lower-class union support for a Socialist 
government in Chile. Almost immediately, CUT was declared illegal by the 
junta, corroborating suspicions that it was behind the blue-collar worker 
demonstrations in support of Allende.60 The junta also took special measures 
to pacify and placate these classes of workers; the tenuous new government 
could not afford to have the large lower class organizing to undermine the 
already ravaged economy. These measures ranged from simple “assurances 
that ‘you and yours’ have nothing to fear from [the] military” to more 
involved, bureaucratic maneuvering.61 The government understood the 
“need to protect the lower income groups in the face of the inevitably steep 
price increases” and, to that end, promised to pay the equivalent of five 
monthly wages over a three-month period, blaming the economic collapse 
“on the previous regime.” They additionally continued their harsh 
crackdown on what they considered “illegal strikes,” that being any 
showcase of organized labor outside that of CUPROCH and AIFLD-
affiliated unions.62  
Allende alluded to CUPROCH and its professional membership in 
his final words to Chile, broadcast over Radio Magallanes, one of the few 
remaining leftwing radio stations left untouched by the Chilean Air Force. 
Quoth Allende; “I address professionals of Chile, patriotic professionals, 
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those who days ago continued working against the sedition sponsored by 
professional associations, class-based associations that also defended the 
advantages which a capitalist society grants to a few.”63 The “professional, 
class-based association” to which he refers is CUPROCH, the primary union 
conglomerate of the opposition movement. His frustration with these 
professional workers is merited; leading up to the coup, “nearly all major 
white-collar, merchant, and professional guilds [were] on strike, most on an 
indefinite basis,” with “little blue-collar support.”64 As evidenced by the 
successful LAN Chile strike, white-collar workers did not need the 
cooperation of their blue-collar coworkers to bring the Chilean economy to 
a grinding halt. This is indicative of the highly stratified, class-based 
political environment exploited by the AIFLD and its affiliated unions. One 
of the most prolific of these affiliated unions was the Confederation of 
Maritime Workers (COMACH), which had also been an important member 
of the short-lived CNT. Its director, Wenceslao Moreno, also served on the 
AIFLD executive board.65 The AIFLD worked with COMACH repeatedly 
over several years leading up to and immediately following the coup, 
providing their members with funding for numerous housing and 
professional development projects.66 On one of these occasions, the AIFLD 
provided COMACH officers stationed in Valparaiso with material gifts and 
equipment, including a modern ship-to-shore radio system to enhance their 
communication abilities.67 The Chilean coup of September 11, 1973 began 
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with two naval units offshore at Valparaiso, allegedly with U.S. Navy 
vessels present.68 
Thus ends the narrative of AIFLD/CIA cooperation in the Chilean 
coup. Nevertheless, the implications of this cooperation for U.S. foreign 
policy were far-reaching, reverberating across the region. The AIFLD, 
sponsored in varying capacities by the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, used 
training programs to institutionalize American political and social mores and 
eventually drew upon those ideological ties to enforce their own vision for 
Chilean political economy, further defining Chilean class consciousness in 
the process. Fred Hirsch, who began investigating these types of operations 
before they were even completed, concluded that “what we are dealing with 
is the Latin American, and specifically Chilean, directed portion of a 
worldwide effort to penetrate and control labour movements. This is an 
indispensable arm of… U.S. intelligence and covert activity.”69 Although 
Latin America was a veritable theater of Communist influence in the late 
twentieth century, this type of strategy was implemented across the globe. 
Kim Scipes, a protégé of Hirsch, cites two additional examples of American 
covert activity dependent upon organized labor subversion: the conflict at 
Atlas Mines in the Philippines through the late 1980s and an attempted coup 
against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela in the 1990s.70 Consequently, 
an operational paradigm begins to emerge to describe the cooperation 
between organized labor and U.S. foreign policy officials. This paradigm 
hypothesizes that “American union leaders work in Latin America explicitly 
for the purpose of building institutions… by which the State Department can 
neutralize Latin American working classes who otherwise might work for 
revolutionary movements.”71 In Chile, it may have been the working classes 
themselves who were ultimately harmed by these operations, as their reward 
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for their efforts was a genocidal dictator who outlawed the union 
confederation that represented 90% of Chilean workers.72 Gimmicks such as 
selective industry denationalization and five months’ wages over a three-
month period were likely insufficient to buy back impassioned support of 
the masses, especially when the junta knew full well that skyrocketing 
inflation would almost certainly negate any benefit derived by these cash 
handouts.73 Ironically, situations such as this demonstrate the need for labor 
unions in developing countries. 
Macroeconomic implications aside, unions represent power for 
both those in their ranks of membership and those against whom the unions 
stand. While this power is their strength, it is also their vulnerability. Power 
makes them an attractive target for institutions looking to subvert such 
power in pursuit of their own goals. In Chile, the American foreign policy 
apparatus, including the CIA, spent over a decade locked in a long-term 
battle for control of Chilean workers. Bolstered by operations of the AIFLD, 
this long-term battle turned into a short-term proxy war between white- and 
blue-collar workers fighting for the presidential palace and, ultimately, the 
political soul of Chile.  
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